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1	 Introduction
For a considerable period of time Johan van der Walt attempted to open 
the eyes of legal scholars to the problem of subjectivism in judicial deci-
sion-making and has sought to theorise an interruption of this subjectivity. 
In addressing this problem the thinking of Jacques Derrida (190-200) has 
played a significant role. In Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid The-
ory of Law (hereafter “LS”) Van der Walt takes further innovative steps in 
this regard. LS is a reworking of a number of essays which have been pub-
lished in law journals over the past number of years on issues such as the hori-
zontal application of fundamental rights, the need for justification in judicial 
decision-making, property rights, socio-economic rights, the death penalty, 
Duncan Kennedy’s fundamental contradiction, plurality, and reconciliation. 
Derrida’s thinking is of great importance for legal theoretical thinking. From 
the central role that Derrida has played in his texts, it is clear that Van der Walt 
shares this view.1 Van der Walt’s publications have deservedly received con-
siderable attention from a number of scholars. Some have reacted positively to 
* I had the privilege, kindly extended to me by Van der Walt, to read this book with students in a course on 
legal interpretation at the University of the Western Cape before its publication in 2005. This opportu-
nity and the discussion with students were of immense value to me. The National Research Foundation 
through their funding of the Research Unit for Legal and Constitutional Interpretation made possible 
the reading of some of Derrida’s texts on two occasions in April 200 and January 2005 in Cape Town 
and Stellenbosch under Van der Walt’s expert guidance. These occasions, as well as numerous other dis-
cussions which I was fortunate enough to have with Van der Walt, were extremely enriching academic 
experiences. Like many others, I am indebted to Van der Walt for the example shown by his outstanding 
scholarship. This review, although critical of his thinking in some respects, will hopefully be read as an 
appreciative engagement, motivated, like Van der Walt’s writing, by a desire for justice. I would in this 
respect like to express my gratitude to three anonymous reviewers for their critical comments which 
assisted with the formulation of the arguments presented here. All errors of course remain my own. Part 
of the time spent in finalising this article was as research fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foun-
dation at the Humboldt University, Berlin. In this respect I would like to extend my gratitude to Folke 
Schuppert for the generous hospitality extended to me.
1 Apart from Van der Walt, a number of scholars have made important contributions to show the significant 
impact that Derrida’s thinking could have on law. They can unfortunately not all be referred to here.
his publications and have even partly adopted his views regarding Derrida.2 
Other scholars have, without really critically enquiring into Van der Walt’s 
understanding of deconstruction and because of the presumed impossibility 
of attaining absolute justice implied by deconstruction, argued that Derrida’s 
thinking does not aid us in making actual judgments in real life; that it is 
similar to an “outsider’s game” – a game that one plays only while still unin-
volved; that it leads the politics of adjudication into a theoretical cul-de-sac;5 
that it undermines any attempt at moving closer to unconditional justice; that 
it involves an obsession with the violence which accompanies law and judg-
ment;7 and that it appears not to differ significantly from political liberalism.8 
At least in South African legal circles, but clearly not only here, these views 
on Derrida’s thinking seem to be prevalent. Van der Walt has responded to 
some of these claims. My contention in this article is that a different reading 
of Derrida can provide a more compelling response. This reading will show 
that Derrida’s “idea” of justice far exceeds Van der Walt’s exposition thereof, 
that it has radical implications for actual judgment, that it is not at all obsessed 
with violence in the sense expressed above, and that it comes nowhere close to 
political liberalism. The publication of LS presents an excellent opportunity for 
this as it invokes and interprets many of Derrida’s texts where these issues are 
addressed. It also allows us to reflect anew on the relation of Derrida’s thinking 
to language as well as the notions of plurality, sacrifice, reconciliation, politics, 
time, friendship, justification, justice and hospitality – themes which are of 
great importance for legal-theoretical thinking as they all relate to justice.
This article therefore wishes to reflect specifically on the way in which Van 
der Walt interprets Derrida or at least the “very specific line of thought in Der-
rida’s work” which he relies on.9 It may be argued that a more balanced assess-
ment of LS is called for in this case as Derrida’s texts are not the only ones Van 
2 See, eg, AJ van der Walt “Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing Property 
Rights in a Constitutional State” 2001 SALJ 258 02-0; Van der Walt & Botha “Democracy and Rights 
in South Africa: Beyond a Constitutional Culture of Justification” 2000 Constellations 1; Christodou-
lidis “Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing of Civil Society” 200 European LJ 01 02-0; 
De Ville “Deference as Respect and Deference as Sacrifice: A Reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs” 200 SAJHR 577.
 See Du Toit The Contribution of Hermeneutics and Deconstruction to Jurisprudence: A Response to Pro-
fessors Du Plessis and Goosen in Bradfield & Van der Merwe (eds) “Meaning” in Legal Interpretation 
(1998) 1 50 (Du Toit does not directly respond here to Van der Walt, but gives a general assessment of 
deconstruction); Le Roux Deconstruction and the Colour of the Dead: A Response to Professor Van der 
Walt in Bradfield & Van der Merwe (eds) “Meaning” in Legal Interpretation (1998) 111 112.
 Du Toit The Contribution of Hermeneutics and Deconstruction 50.
5 Davis “Duncan Kennedy’s A Critique of Adjudication: A Challenge to the ‘Business as Usual’ Approach 
of South African Lawyers” 2000 SALJ 97 710. For a response, see Van der Walt ‘‘The Quest for the 
Impossible, the Beginning of Politics: A Reply to Dennis Davis” 2001 SALJ .
 Davis 2001 SALJ 711.
7 Davis 2001 SALJ 711. See also LS 71 n .
8 Michelman “Postmodernism, Proceduralism and Constitutional Justice: A Comment on Van der Walt 
and Botha” 2002 9 Constellations 2. For a response, see Van der Walt Frankly Befriending the Fun-
damental Contradiction: Frank Michelman and Critical Legal Thought in Botha et al (eds) Rights and 
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (200) 21-20.
9 See LS 27. 
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der Walt relies on in constructing a post-apartheid theory of law.10 His very 
wide ranging and thorough analysis includes references to the thinking of 
Thomas of Aquinas, Kant, Husserl, Schmitt, Heidegger, Arendt, Levinas, 
Nancy, and Agamben, to mention only the most prominent. It may be said that 
even though there may be differences of opinion regarding the reading of Der-
rida, Van der Walt’s approach and theoretical model could easily be justified 
philosophically with reference to one or more of these thinkers. LS may more 
specifically be said to appear particularly close to the thinking of Heidegger. 
This article will not seek to contest or enquire in detail into this possibility. 
This is not because the work of Heidegger and the other thinkers, or the way in 
which Van der Walt relies on them is not important, original or interesting. It is 
first to be noted that with regard to all of the themes that will be enquired into 
here, Van der Walt either aligns the thinking of these philosophers with that of 
Derrida or departs from them and “follows” Derrida, more particularly in those 
instances where Derrida’s thinking on Van der Walt’s reading differs from that 
of the other philosophers. With regard to Heidegger, for example, Van der Walt 
takes great care to show the similarities rather than the differences with Der-
rida.11 A focus primarily on Derrida is therefore justified through the reliance 
placed on Derrida in LS. Secondly, this article would exceed its permissible 
length were such an analysis to be properly undertaken.12
Some may furthermore argue that Van der Walt’s reading of Derrida is not 
something that can be analysed. How could one have a discussion of different 
interpretations of Derrida’s texts, when he himself emphasised the instability 
of written texts, undecidability, indeterminacy, and dissemination? Such argu-
ments or questions are usually made or raised with a general reference to “all 
of Derrida’s work”. If one reads his texts, it is not, however, difficult to find 
an answer to such arguments or questions. One of the clearest answers can be 
found in Limited Inc where Derrida responds to a question from Gerald Graff 
on the implications of his (Derrida’s) thinking for interpretation. Derrida com-
ments on Searle who in his reading was not “attentive” to the way in which 
Derrida uses the word restance (remains). Had he been attentive, Derrida says 
“he would have been on the right track and well on the way…to reading me 
… [f]or of course there is a ‘right track’ … a better way”.1 Many other texts of 
Derrida can also be found where he addresses both those who are sympathetic 
10 For a balanced and overall positive review of LS, see Singer “Book Review” 200 Social and Legal 
Studies: An International Journal 05. Cf, however, Bohler-Muller “On Desire, Transcendence and Sac-
rifice” 2007 Law and Critique 25 who views Van der Walt’s account as too pessimistic insofar as life-
with-others is concerned.
11 See especially LS ch 7.
12 This review can at least be said to engage in an indirect, albeit brief manner with some of these think-
ers (at least insofar as they are discussed by Van der Walt) and the relation of their thinking with that of 
Derrida. 
1 Derrida Limited Inc (1988) 1. The whole paragraph from which the passage to be quoted has been 
extracted is of relevance here.
and unsympathetic to his work, and where he seeks to correct mistaken read-
ings of his texts.1 A perusal of the many interviews with Derrida will show that 
he does the same in response to questions posed to him concerning his work.15 
Of course there is some sense in which one can say that a discussion about 
the interpretation of Derrida’s texts is not possible. That is, as the argument 
below shows, insofar as Derrida’s texts invoke “the impossible”, which strictly 
speaking “no longer belong[s] to the horizon of sense”.1 This does not in itself 
prevent discussion of the interpretation of Derrida’s texts.17
As for the relevance of Derrida’s thinking for the readers of this journal, this 
article departs from a position of faith in the commitment to justice of these 
readers, believing that they will regard as important a discussion concerning 
Derrida’s profound thinking which had always been primarily about justice.18 
His thinking about language exposes to us the metaphysical assumptions upon 
which Western (legal) thinking is based and indicates to us a new way of think-
ing about law and its relation to justice. LS takes important steps in showing 
us this way. As indicated above, this review will nevertheless raise a number 
of questions regarding the steps taken by Van der Walt. As will become clear, 
the main point of theoretical dispute with Van der Walt, which this article seeks 
to address, relates to Derrida’s thinking on language. It will be contended that 
language cannot be rigorously distinguished from consciousness of reality 
in Derrida’s thinking. This will place a question mark behind Van der Walt’s 
attempt to link plurality with the unconditional in Derrida’s thinking and his 
reliance on phenomenology in order to posit plurality. It will furthermore be 
contended that the unconditional in Derrida’s thinking, which is tied closely to 
his views on language, exceeds what Van der Walt understands under plural-
ity and that the unconditional exceeds phenomenology. In addition, questions 
will be raised concerning the political consequences of the legal theory of Van 
der Walt. It will be shown that, because his approach is phenomenological in 
nature and therefore allied with the metaphysics of presence, it almost inevi-
tably has certain conservative political consequences. A different reading of 
Derrida, it will be argued, allows us to view plurality, sacrifice, reconciliation, 
politics, time, friendship, justification and hospitality in a different way so as to 
construct an alternative post-apartheid theory of law. As will briefly be shown, 
this holds important implications for constitutional interpretation.
This review of LS will roughly follow its chapters.19 A short overview of the 
book will first be given. This overview is necessarily somewhat simplistic, but 
1 See, eg, Derrida “A Letter to Peter Eisenman” 1990 Assemblage , Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005) 
17-175 n 1, “Critical Response II: But, beyond…(Open Letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon)” 
198 Critical Inquiry 155, and Limited Inc 15-158 n 9 on Habermas’s reading of Derrida.
15 See, eg, Derrida in “Die Tragiese, die Onmoontlike en die Demokrasie: ’n Onderhoud met Jacques Der-
rida” 1999 Fragmente 5 where Derrida engages inter alia with Johan van der Walt on the interpretation 
of his (Derrida’s) texts. 
1 Derrida On the Name (1995) 92-9.
17 See specifically Derrida Limited Inc 1-17.
18 See Derrida Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Carlson (eds) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992)  7.
19 For reasons of space, horizontal application and the death penalty – the focus of chapters 1, 2 and  – will 
not be analysed in detail. This does not mean that these chapters or the appendix will be ignored in the 
analysis that follows. The introductory chapter of LS will be referred to throughout.
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it is meant to provide a context for the analysis that will follow. Thereafter a 
more detailed enquiry will be made into Van der Walt’s analysis of language, 
existence and time, which will roughly correspond with chapters  and 7 of 
LS. The next enquiry will be into the unconditional in Van der Walt’s thinking, 
more specifically with regard to hospitality and justice. This discussion is cen-
tral to chapters  and 8 of LS. Chapter 5 of LS, on law and sacrifice, will be the 
focus of the analysis under paragraph 5 of this review. In concluding, a reading 
of LS will be attempted that seeks to align it more closely with that of Derrida. 
As will be shown, LS stands readily open to such a reading.
2	 Themes	and	terminology
In the introductory chapter of LS, Van der Walt sets out the main themes of 
the book. Van der Walt indicates that he agrees with those in the Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) movement who equate law and politics.20 He says, however, that 
he will seek to resist this inevitable involvement of law with politics by drawing 
a distinction between politics and the political.21 Whereas politics (la politique) 
entails the exercise of power, which leads to the destruction of plurality, he 
associates the political (le politique) with democracy (an empty space),22 plu-
rality, the public interest, the public, alterity, and otherness.2 According to Van 
der Walt, judicial, legislative and executive decisions are inevitably in favour 
of one or some at the cost of another or others. In every judicial, executive or 
legislative decision, where two viewpoints are presented (what is referred to as 
plurality) one of these viewpoints will in other words be sacrificed in the deci-
sion that is taken. We can also say that in every case to be decided (the focus 
in the book is specifically on judicial decisions) there will be a retreat from the 
public, from the political, from plurality (a retreat from multiple possibilities, 
opinions and convictions occasioned by political differences and otherness).2 
A judicial decision thus “retreats” from plurality and plurality “retreats” from 
the judicial decision.25
Van der Walt argues for the retrieval of plurality and of the political from 
its inevitable withdrawal in present representations thereof.2 This withdrawal 
can be said to take place through a “privatisation” of the public, apartheid 
being the example par excellence of such privatisation.27 Van der Walt conse-
quently argues that the sacrificial dynamics of representation and privatisation 
that are at stake in every judicial decision must be examined and acknowl-
edged. By doing this, a judicial decision would become a “political” decision, 
and a retrieval of plurality would in a certain sense be achieved. This approach 
20 LS  1.
21 Van der Walt LS -7 relies in this respect on the texts of Claude Lefort, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy.
22 LS 5, relying on Claude Lefort.
2 LS -7. 
2 LS 9-10.
25 LS 9.
2 LS 10. Van der Walt invokes Hannah Arendt to make his argument in favour of plurality (LS 8-9), although 
he is critical of Arendt’s thinking insofar as it shows too uncritical a belief in the possibility of the politi-
cal and of plurality.
27 LS 8 10.
would allow one in each new decision that has to be taken, to again reconsider 
the sacrifices that were made earlier. It should be clear from the above that 
Van der Walt does not agree with depictions of the public or the public inter-
est as a collective, as norms held in common, as a unity or a body of consen-
sus.28 The inevitable result of a judicial decision is nevertheless a representa-
tion that “reduces to oneness the multiple conflicting desires and concerns that 
inform the law in a contradictory fashion”.29 Social ambiguity and multiplicity 
are in other words reduced through the judicial decision – they are turned into 
simplicity and oneness.0 Van der Walt, however, argues, as we saw, that by 
acknowledging the sacrificial destruction of plurality performed by the judicial 
decision, plurality would be retrieved, albeit as lost plurality.1
The policy of apartheid in South Africa obviously involved excessive sac-
rifices.2 Post-apartheid law, Van der Walt argues, should consist in a constant 
regard for and an acknowledgement of the sacrificial destruction of otherness. 
The idea behind the acknowledgement of sacrifice or the attempted retrieval 
of plurality is a restriction of social sacrifices to those that are absolutely in- 
evitable. As all judicial decisions (sometimes all “serious” ones)5 inevitably 
involve sacrifice, the question arises which ones should be regarded as permis-
sible. Determining whether sacrifice is excessive, calls for measurement. Van 
der Walt finds the appropriate measurement in the notion of justification. All 
conduct by subjects or agents of social power should be subject to this require-
ment.7 Unlike other (liberal) theorists, Van der Walt notes that justification 
should not be equated with justice or the provision of just grounds for a deci-
sion.8 In fact, there should be an acknowledgement in a judicial decision of 
the inevitably “unjust grounds” on which every such decision is based.9 This 
clearly ties in with the earlier insistence on the recognition of sacrifice and the 
need for the “retrieval” of plurality in a judicial decision. It also ties in with 
Van der Walt’s insistence on horizontality. In accordance with his proposal, the 
claim of a losing party will not be dismissed, but “set aside”, thereby keeping it 
“alongside”.0 This is an attempt at ensuring a “non-normative human dignity”, 
a radical equality, co-existence, or the horizontality of mortals, although these 
will always remain in retreat.1
28 LS 8 10.
29 LS 11.
0 LS 11.
1 LS 11-12.
2 LS 1.
 LS 19.
 LS 1 19.
5 See LS 9 and 201-20: “The crisis of application inheres in the inevitability of having to reduce to oneness 
or one sentence and thus destroy the plurality of convictions that inform every serious legal question or 
conflict.” Cf LS 11 (all judicial decisions); LS 70-71 (all decisions); LS 17 (each and every legal decision); 
LS 208 (every judicial decision); LS 22 (every judicial decision).
 LS 72.
7 LS 7.
8 Van der Walt LS 15 here invokes Derrida’s distinction between law and justice.
9 LS 15.
0 LS 1 2-25.
1 LS 17.
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3	 Language,	existence	and	time
At the heart of the argument presented in LS is the relationship between lan-
guage, time and what Van der Walt refers to as “existence”. In the introductory 
chapter Van der Walt notes that in chapter 7 he will articulate
“an understanding of phenomenology as the retrieval of the irreducible plurality of existence that 
withdraws from the destruction of plurality that takes place in every particular representation of exist-
ence at any given point in time. The retrieval of the political from (its retreat from) politics and legal 
politics that the understanding of law as sacrifice pursues turns on this phenomenological retrieval 
of plurality.”2
In the rest of LS and specifically chapter 7, Van der Walt takes the interest-
ing and challenging step of seeking to reconcile this thinking (which he relates 
to that of Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Lefort and Heidegger) with that of Derrida. 
Hospitality in Derrida’s thinking, Van der Walt tells us, “too also comes to the 
fore in the event of a tragic juridical destruction of hospitality”. Hospitality is 
a necessary part of plurality. Van der Walt puts it as follows:
“Hospitality is the condition without which the other cannot appear alongside the self so as to bring 
about plurality. However, hospitality is also the condition of the retreating advent through which plu-
rality becomes possible.”
From the introductory chapter it becomes clear that Van Walt draws a cor-
relation between that which comes to presence (or present actualisations of 
existence) and representation. That which is present is also that which is repre-
sented. Plurality (or the political or the public), however, withdraws from the 
“process of representation”, he tells us.5 Representation destroys the plural. 
In chapter 7 Van der Walt elaborates on this through his reading of Derrida’s 
Rogues and Speech and Phenomena7 and the analysis there of sovereignty 
and the notions of time and signs in Husserl. Van der Walt’s reading, which 
at first appears unproblematic, shows how the two texts tie in with each other 
in respect of sovereignty and consciousness.8 Consciousness, he argues with 
reference to Derrida, can never be purely present to itself. It is always in 
need of “external” signs, language or communication. The same applies to 
sovereignty. Whereas Husserl believed that linguistic signification simply 
repeats in a secondary fashion an original meaning, Derrida maintains that 
“present meaning is the product of repetition”.9 “It is the repetition of the sign 
under varying circumstances”, Van der Walt reminds us, which “allows for its 
specific meaning under present circumstances”.50 Leaving out a few lines that 
relate more directly to time, to which we will return shortly, Van der Walt tells 
2 LS 7.
 LS 12.
 LS 12.
5 LS 12 20. See further LS 200-20 where this reduction from plurality to oneness is elaborated on with 
reference to Agamben’s discussion of the passage from langue to parole and of the senate (auctoritas) and 
magistrates (potestas) in Roman law. 
 LS 10.
7 (197).
8 LS 217-218.
9 LS 218.
50 LS 218.
us that “Derrida would assert contra Husserl that the sign, which always signi-
fies absence (since signification would not be necessary if the signified were 
present), is older than the presence that Husserl ascribes to meaning”.51 This 
reading of Derrida has enormous potential. It hints at Derrida’s “diagnosis” 
of philosophical thinking from Plato to Hegel (and even Heidegger) as being 
based on a view of language which privileges presence, as well as the intention 
and consciousness of the subject, and the proximity of the voice.52
Taking our leave from LS for a moment, Derrida questions the classi-
cal assumptions regarding the meaning-function of language, that it is struc-
tured or made possible by the intentional and conscious acts of a speaker fully 
present to him- or herself.5 This idea is based on the assumption that language 
is simply a transparent medium or vehicle for the transportation of meaning, 
which is already present prior to the act of uttering or writing down of words to 
the consciousness of the speaker or writer.5 Derrida contends that language is 
not a self-transparent medium for thought – neither in the case of speech nor of 
writing.55 In enquiring into that which makes meaning possible, Derrida points 
out that the marks5 that are used by the speaker or the writer can function in 
their absence as well as in the absence of the intended addressee, also in the 
event of their death.57 Iterability, the ability of language to function and pro-
duce effects in the absence of the speaker or sender and addressee, the (secret) 
law of language in other words, entails more than the classical concept of 
repetition (repeating an original thing which comes first).58 An “essential” 
feature of language is its “non-presence”: it can function and produce effects 
without the self-present thought of a subject, also in the event of his or her 
death. The relation with death is therefore also an essential feature of language. 
Taking account of Freud’s insight into the death drive and the logic of the 
repetition compulsion, which play a deciding role in our reliance on language, 
we can say that language is structured by the relation to death, which can be 
referred to as a type of structural unconscious.59 Language or the marks of lan-
guage are thus not made possible by a subject or a signified; these are effects 
of that which structures language.0 This has the consequence that language 
cannot be possessed, that it cannot be appropriated.1 The appropriations that 
do take place are effects of the structure of language, and do not arise from a 
pure self-present identity or from reality. Language, Derrida points out, is the 
51 LS 219.
52 See, eg, Derrida Dissemination (200) 7-18, Of Grammatology (197) -2, Speech and Phenomena 
-2.
5 See in this respect all the essays of Derrida in Limited Inc (1988). Space does again not allow for a full 
analysis. 
5 This is also the dominant way in which Constitutions are viewed in legal theory.
55 Of Grammatology 1-17.
5 Derrida sometimes uses the term “mark” rather than sign because of the sign’s metaphysical presupposi-
tions. The notion of the sign is based on the distinction and link between a signifier and a signified: see 
Derrida Speech and Phenomena 18, Positions (200) 17-22.
57 Derrida Margins of Philosophy (1982) 1-17.
58 Derrida The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1987) 51, Limited Inc 70-71.
59 Derrida The Post Card 1 - 51-52 2, Speech and Phenomena 0, Margins of Philosophy 18-
19, Limited Inc 7.
0 Derrida Limited Inc 7, Glas (198) , Positions 25-2, Margins of Philosophy 1-17.
1 Derrida Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin (1998) 2-25 0 8.
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language of the other; it returns to the other, exists asymmetrically, always for 
the other, kept by the other, coming from the other, the coming of the other.2 
The “other” here should not be understood as another person or being. The 
“other” concerns, first of all, representation and the relation with death. The 
functional structure of language thus entails non-life, non-presence, non- 
possession, expropriation, unconditional justice, absolute hospitality, and the 
perfect gift.
This structure of language is not, however, what Van der Walt explores. Let 
us return now to the passages in LS which set out the argument on time that 
were left out previously, which may explain Van der Walt’s approach. Van 
der Walt refers here to Husserl’s insight that the present moment retains within 
itself the moment preceding it and an anticipation of the moment that will 
succeed it. In the introductory chapter of LS, Van der Walt also tells us that 
Derrida’s notion of counter-time is derived from Husserl’s phenomenology of 
inner time consciousness.5 In terms of this analysis, a present moment always 
retains traces of the past and the future. The present is thus never simply and 
fully itself. Derrida, Van der Walt asserts, nevertheless criticises Husserl for 
his attempt to found phenomenology on the presence of a present moment. 
According to Van der Walt, Derrida radicalises phenomenology and “empha-
sises the exteriority, the pasts and futures that produces what appears to be a 
present moment”. Van der Walt refers in this regard to the “spectral mode 
of the future anterior” in Derrida’s thinking, “the moment that will have been 
without ever having been present”.7 In the same vein, Van der Walt, in chapter 
7, contends the following regarding Husserl’s insight regarding time:
“This insight, argued Derrida, confirms the presence of a non-presence and an alterity in the very moment 
(Augenblick) of full presence that Husserl ascribes to original meaning. Husserl’s ‘originary’ moment of 
meaning’s ‘immediate’ and ‘indivisible’ self-presence (or ipseity, as Derrida would put it in Voyous) is 
always already divided in itself between presence and non-presence, identity and alterity.”8
With reference to Derrida, Van der Walt extends this idea to the notion of a 
“counter-time of a counter-day” which “disjoins the present of the present”.9 
This is the time of friendship, Van der Walt tells us, “albeit the mourning sur-
vival of ruined friendships, the time of friendship that manifests itself only by 
withdrawing from presence”.70 Van der Walt relates this understanding of time 
2 Derrida Monolingualism of the Other 0 8.
 See Derrida Glas 78. See further 78-79 where Derrida brings the phrase “I am already dead, even before 
living” in relation to his discussion of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. 
 LS 218-219. On my reading, Derrida in the first pages of Speech and Phenomena (see also chs 1-7) does not 
refer to a distinction that Husserl draws between expression (Ausdruck) and meaning (Bedeutung) (see LS 
217), but instead to a distinction between signs of expression (Ausdruck) and of indication (Anzeichen). 
This distinction relates to the privilege that Husserl grants to consciousness and self-present meaning. 
Derrida complicates this distinction by showing that all signs (also when used in silent monologue) are 
caught up within an indicative process, another name for the relation with death (0 5). Van der Walt’s 
reading necessarily affects, at least in an indirect way, the way in which he views the “notion” of counter-
time in Derrida’s thinking. 
5 LS 2.
 LS 2.
7 LS 2.
8 LS 218-219.
9 LS 219. See also LS 22.
70 LS 219.
also with sovereign judicial decisions which, as we saw above, dismiss for the 
moment one of two competing claims to justice. Such a present statement of 
the law in a present moment is “always already divided within itself by the 
non-presence of past and future possibilities of the law”.71
The question that arises is how we managed to move from Derrida’s think-
ing of language as something which cannot be possessed and thus uncondi-
tional justice or absolute hospitality, to a view of justice which is related to the 
competing claims of justice of the parties to a legal dispute. Can Speech and 
Phenomena be read so as to say that Derrida adopts the insight of Husserl on 
time? Is the “counter-time” or the “future anterior” which Van der Walt speaks 
of, the same as what Derrida “means” when he refers to time in this way? This 
question is already problematic, because it assumes that for Derrida, time is 
something that is related to meaning. This is not the case, and here, on my read-
ing, lies the main difference between Derrida’s “notions” of “counter-time” 
and the “future anterior”, and the views of Van der Walt.
Before we return to Speech and Phenomena, we need to look at a number 
of Derrida’s other texts that relate to time. In Gift of Death, Derrida reads 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. Derrida refers to 
the paradoxical situation within which Abraham finds himself: on the one hand 
he has to sacrifice his son (and therefore himself) in terms of God’s command; 
on the other hand, doing so would constitute murder in the eyes of law and 
ethics. Derrida also points to Kierkegaard’s famous expression that “the instant 
of decision is madness” and continues as follows:
“The paradox cannot be grasped in time and through mediation, that is to say in language and through 
reason. Like the gift and ‘the gift of death’, it remains irreducible to presence or to presentation, it 
demands a temporality of the instant without ever constituting a present. If it can be said, it belongs 
to an atemporal temporality, to a duration that cannot be grasped: something one can neither stabilize, 
establish, grasp [prendre], apprehend, or comprehend.”72
Similar passages can be found in many of Derrida’s other texts where he 
relates this a-temporality or the “future anterior” with the incalculable, the 
unconditional, the “to come”, and the impossible, as that which makes time 
and meaning possible.7 The a-temporal “is” in other words a time that will 
never be present; it exceeds the time of the present, and bears no relation to 
a past or a future as a modified presence.7 This allows us to analyse more 
closely the passage which Van der Walt quotes from Speech and Phenomena, 
and which informs his view of counter-time:
“As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the 
zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other 
into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of an 
instant. There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for 
presence…”75
71 LS 220.
72 Derrida The Gift of Death (1995) 5.
7 See, eg, Derrida Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1992), Acts of Literature (1992) 1-, Politics of 
Friendship (1997) 1-17 2-8 29-250, Rogues 5-9, Hostipitality in Thomassen (ed) The Derrida-
Habermas Reader (200) 225-22, Force of Law 2-28, Glas 79.
7 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 12-1.
75 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 5, LS 219.
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There are no major differences between Van der Walt’s translation and the 
one cited above. At stake is how we understand this passage, specifically the 
phrases the “continuity of the now and the not-now”; “we admit the other”, or 
as Van der Walt has it, “one welcomes the other”; and “[t]his alterity is in fact 
the condition for presence”. We already have some idea of how Van der Walt 
understands these phrases and how it will significantly affect the way in which 
he understands justice and its relation to law. What was said above regarding 
a-temporality in Derrida’s thinking must already raise questions about Van der 
Walt’s interpretation. From the context of the above passage it is clear that Der-
rida does not adopt Husserl’s notion of inner-time consciousness. According 
to Derrida, Husserl still privileges the present or the now through retention.7 
Husserl also privileges the present through the notion of solitary discourse, 
which, according to Husserl, requires no expression, representation, or langu-
age: it is a moment of pure presence.77 Derrida, however, shows that another 
logic is at work in Husserl’s text and that Husserl himself agrees that soli-
tary discourse cannot take place without signs or representation.78 Like Husserl 
(and Rousseau as we will see below), Van der Walt finds representation pro-
blematic. He contends that Derrida has similar problems with representation.79 
My reading of Derrida’s texts does not confirm this contention. For Derrida 
the sign or representation “is” the moment of non-presence, alterity or the rela-
tion with death that always disrupts presence.80 This also complicates Husserl’s 
insight into the dividedness of a present moment in time. It is not simply that 
the present moment refers to past and future moments,81 but that time is always 
disrupted by the non-presence produced by signs.82 As we saw above, this does 
not refer simply to a past or future moment, but to a time that has never been 
present. The not-now and nonperception that Derrida refers to in the quotation 
above is consequently not a reference to a past or future present, but to expres-
sion, representation, language, or the relation with death, which “is” a non-
presence.8 The admission or welcome of the other and the “notion” of alterity 
must similarly be understood in terms of the impossibility of pure presence of 
the self to itself.8 Even in the case of silent thinking or internal monologue, 
7 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 1-9. See also Derrida Margins of Philosophy .
77 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 70-87. 
78 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 82.
79 See eg LS 28 where Van der Walt refers to Derrida’s alleged “acute regard for the reductive dynamics of 
sacrifice that lies at the heart of representation and the representational mode of thinking that commence 
the moment one needs to state the status of something”. 
80 See also Derrida Of Grammatology 295-1 where Rousseau’s criticism of representation is analysed. 
81 Van der Walt LS 2 puts this as follows: “Instead of the present, Derrida’s deconstruction or radicalisa-
tion of phenomenology emphasizes the spectral mode of the future anterior, the moment that will have 
been without ever having been present. This moment is or will always have been spaced between and thus 
displaced by pasts and futures, expropriated by pasts and futures” (footnote omitted).
82 See Derrida Speech and Phenomena 15: “[S]ince the possibility of constituting ideal objects belongs 
to the essence of consciousness, and since these ideal objects are historical products, only appearing 
thanks to acts of creation or intending, the element of consciousness and the element of language will be 
more and more difficult to discern. Will not their indiscernibility introduce nonpresence and difference 
(mediation, signs, referral back, etc) in the heart of self-presence?”
8 See Derrida Speech and Phenomena -7 15. Van der Walt’s view of death is tied to horizontality: see LS 82.
8 Cf specifically Derrida Speech and Phenomena 58-59 0 where Derrida speaks of non-alterity within 
the context of Husserl’s discussion of internal monologue or pure presence to the self which according to 
Husserl does not entail the use of signs. 
language or representation is involved; the other or alterity, which must here 
be read as a reference to (the law of) language or representation, “is” in other 
words admitted or welcomed: we are never quite alone with ourselves in self 
presence so as to found a pure source from which knowledge can be derived.85 
The fact that time belongs to no one,8 does not therefore mean, at least not for 
Derrida, that it belongs to everyone.87 Regarding time still as belonging, albeit 
to everyone, is very likely to lead to a conservative politics. The same is likely 
to happen if one views democracy as a temporal democracy, as a “government 
by everyone and no one”.88 Such a democracy still remains attached to self-
government or the notion of the power of the people.
The above analysis also enables us to understand differently the reference of 
Van der Walt to Derrida asserting “contra Husserl that the sign…is older than 
the originary presence that Husserl ascribes to meaning”.89 Even in the event 
of internal discourse, as we saw above, language is admitted or welcomed 
“into the self-identity of the Augenblick”. As his other texts also show, Der-
rida has no complaint that language cannot succeed in adequately representing 
reality or existence. Everything begins with representation, Derrida says.90 In 
Of Grammatology,91 Derrida shows the problematic relation of Rousseau with 
signs and representation. There are marked similarities between Derrida’s ana-
lysis of Rousseau and LS in relation to the notion of representation. Accor-
ding to Rousseau, signs and representation disrupt pure presence. Van der Walt 
similarly finds representation problematic because it cannot adequately present 
the irreducible plurality of existence. Rousseau and Van der Walt both seek a 
return to an origin, which is believed to precede representation – Rousseau to 
nature and the people as pure presence, and Van der Walt to (consciousness of) 
the irreducible plurality of existence.92 Representation, necessary as it may be, 
must according to Rousseau and Van der Walt remain as close as possible to 
reality, nature or existence. Rousseau therefore insists that the representatives 
need to be changed often and that speech or the living voice need to characte-
rise political discourse.9 Van der Walt in similar fashion insists that plurality 
85 See also LS 21 n 1 where Van der Walt links his phenomenological approach with the attainment of a 
secure basis for knowledge.
8 See LS 17 2; Derrida Given Time .
87 See LS 2 8 on time belonging to everyone.
88 LS 17 2 5.
89 LS 219.
90 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 5 n  – taking account of the fact that both “begin” and “representation” 
must not be understood in their traditional sense. Representation should not be understood here as the 
making present in signs of something which is already present in reality. This would be a metaphysical 
understanding of representation.
91 295-1.
92 The predominant approach in legal thinking is to regard the people as presence or legitimating source 
of a Constitution; see, eg, Böckenförde Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff 
des Verfassungsrechts (198); Mohnhaupt & Grimm Verfassung: Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der 
Antike bis zur Gegenwart 2 ed (2002) 100-11; Rubenfeld Legitimacy and Interpretation in Alexander 
(ed) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (1998) 19-2. See, eg, Derrida Of Grammatology 
197 on Rousseau: “On several levels, nature is the ground, the inferior step: it must be crossed, exceeded, 
but also rejoined. We must return to it, but without annulling the difference. This difference, separating 
the imitation from what it imitates, must be almost nil.”
9 See Derrida Of Grammatology 02.
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needs to be retrieved from representation. Derrida,9 however, shows how what 
is assumed to be without representation (for example, nature in Rousseau) is 
always already affected by representation. Derrida, as we saw, similarly finds 
it problematic that Husserl posits a pure self-presence and that he views signs 
as secondary.95 Husserl also seeks a moment of pure self-presence without 
representation.9 No irreducible plurality of existence, pure self-conscious-
ness or nature can, however, be said to precede language from which point of 
view language can be viewed or thought of.97 It is impossible to distinguish 
rigorously between representation and (consciousness of) reality.98 It is not there-
fore, according to Derrida, the case that something goes wrong or gets lost in 
representation, but rather that representation cannot be viewed from a position 
of pure self-presence. It can only be viewed from the “law” which structures it, 
or what Derrida refers to as différance, general writing, or iterability.99
As we have seen above, Van der Walt equates that which is represented 
with (what comes to) presence. When he refers to Derrida saying that the sign 
“always signifies absence”, we now see that he understands this as an absence 
in the sense of something (a signified) that does not get represented in the 
sign. This is of course an important aspect of Derrida’s thinking regarding 
language, but the consequences Van der Walt draws from this are, I would con-
tend, different from those drawn by Derrida.100 Van der Walt retains the notion 
of the sign – the distinction between a signifier and a signified – and in this way 
leaves open the possibility of a signified existing in itself, outside of language 
and purely present to thought.101 For Derrida, as we saw above, this absence 
of a signified, as well as the absence and potential death of the speaker/sender 
and the addressee, is what structures language and holds important implicati-
ons, inter alia the impossibility of its being possessed. This is because, as the 
phrase “there is nothing outside the text” indicates, there is no transcendental 
signified outside of language, which can root language in something fixed and 
certain.102 “[E]very signified is also in the position of a signifier”, Derrida10 
says. For Van der Walt, as we saw, this absence (the irreducible plurality of exi-
stence which functions as transcendental signified) needs to be retrieved from 
representation. As Derrida10 explains, keeping the notion of the sign inevita-
9 Of Grammatology 09 12. 
95 See also LS 217-218.
9 See also LS 217-218.
97 See in this regard Derrida Limited Inc 9 on this characteristic of all metaphysical thinking which he 
describes as follows: “The enterprise of returning ‘strategically,’ ideally, to an origin or to a ‘priority’ 
held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of deriva-
tion, complication, deterioration, accident, etc.”
98 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 15 9.
99 The non-concept of différance of course ties in with what was said above regarding the structure of 
language. It engages inter alia with the contention of Ferdinand de Saussure that in language there are 
only differences without positive terms and that language is not a function of the speaking subject (the 
subject is inscribed in language or a function of language). It also engages with the Freudian notion of the 
death instinct and the putting off, postponement or placing in reserve of the relation to death: see Derrida 
Margins of Philosophy -27, Positions 22-27.
100 See specifically in this regard Derrida Margins of Philosophy 19-21.
101 See Derrida Positions 19 commenting on De Saussure.
102 Derrida Limited Inc 18.
10 Positions 19.
10 Positions 20.
bly leads to privileging the voice as being closest to the thought of the signi-
fied concept. Speech, it is believed, erases the signifier as soon as it is uttered, 
making it transparent and reducing the exteriority of the signifier.105 We detect 
something of this not only in the fact that Van der Walt denigrates representa-
tion, but also when he says that “[m]an is irreducibly the animal with language. 
He can at most become the animal that fails or refuses to speak, fails or refuses 
to speak or acknowledge sacrifice.”10 Speaking, it appears from this passage, 
is for Van der Walt the way in which the (absent) signified can best be made 
“present”.107
Because of his adoption of the metaphysical notion of the sign, Van der 
Walt effectively adopts three levels of analysis: (1) the irreducible plurality of 
existence before language comes into play, which consciousness can become 
aware of through phenomenological reduction; (2) sovereignty, law, politics 
and language which fail to acknowledge the sacrifice involved in representa-
tion; and (3) law and language, which acknowledge sacrifice and therefore 
retrieve plurality.108 Although Van der Walt appears to be following Derrida in 
not regarding plurality (on level 1 and in a sense, level ) as a “presence”,109 
representation is for Van der Walt, as in all metaphysical thinking, a mere tran-
sition stage in the turn of the circle of logos from the self (consciousness) back 
to itself. Language, we can also say, for Van der Walt, provides the mediating 
point between archē and telos. The consequences of these seemingly small dif-
ferences in thinking about language are immense, as will appear shortly. At the 
risk of repetition, for Derrida there can be no pure self-presence or an irreduc-
ible plurality of existence of which consciousness can become aware because 
language, and thus representation, is always already involved.110 Derrida puts 
this as follows:
“But there is every reason to believe that representation and reality are not merely added together here 
and there in language, for the simple reason that it is impossible in principle rigorously to distinguish 
them. And it doesn’t help to say that this happens in language; language in general – and language 
alone – is this.”111
For Derrida there is thus no level 1, as there is for Van der Walt, because lan-
guage is always already involved. There “is” only language, but language “is” 
structured by death and dispossession.112 The three levels of analysis in Van der 
105 Derrida Positions 20-21.
10 LS 1.
107 Cf in this respect Derrida’s comments on Husserl’s similar strategy in Speech and Phenomena 1.
108 See specifically LS 10.
109 LS 7 8 12 1 2. Plurality is sometimes referred to in the same breath as the ideal of revolutionary consti-
tutionalism: see LS 9-0. On the ideal in phenomenology, see Derrida Speech and Phenomena 5-5.
110 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 8-9.
111 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 9-50. See also Derrida Limited Inc 8 102 on the transgression of “the 
alternative of existence and non-existence”. We can now see that Van der Walt’s notion of representation 
as that which comes to presence, referred to at the beginning of this paragraph, conforms with the classi-
cal idea of representation – a reduplication (an inadequate one in this case) that befalls simple presence: 
see Derrida Speech and Phenomena 5 n  and 57 n .
112 Language thus always involves violence, but in a different sense than is usually understood in legal 
scholarship with reference to Derrida. The violence that is at stake in language deprives us of our 
possession thereof, deprives us of self-presence, and thus opens the possibility for unconditional justice: 
see Derrida Of Grammatology 112. 
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Walt’s thinking also explain his reliance on Derrida in favour of a phenomeno-
logical approach to justice.
The phenomenological approach adopted by Van der Walt in relation to adju-
dication is partly a result of his reading of Derrida as “belonging to a line of 
phenomenological thought that runs from Husserl and through Heidegger”.11 
Derrida is relied on in this context because of his “radical extension” of the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger.11 Whereas Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy merely “traverses plurality” and “ultimately celebrates a return to one-
ness”, Heidegger and Derrida mourn ruined pluralities, according to Van der 
Walt.115 Van der Walt traces this “mourning” to Heidegger’s reflections on the 
ontological difference and the retrieval of the lēthe of alētheia as well as to 
Derrida’s reflections on the ruins of friendship (understood as plurality).11 Van 
der Walt, through a phenomenological reduction or bracketing of naïve con-
sciousness, seeks to expose to consciousness the irreducible plurality of exist-
ence. This reduction in other words seeks to “bracket” language or representa-
tion.117 From this (stable) position of phenomenological awareness, language 
and law would then be judged inadequate, as not being able to adequately 
represent existence. The destruction of plurality, according to Van der Walt, 
comes about because of the sacrificial structure of language and law, being 
unable to represent plurality.118 A critical phenomenology, Van der Walt con-
cludes, “would ultimately have to retrieve plurality from its ruins”.119 This 
should happen, as we saw above, through the acknowledgment of the sacri-
fice that takes place through every judicial decision which ruins the multiple 
possibilities or plurality of the law.120 Van der Walt, we also noted above, relates 
justice to the unfulfilled claim to justice of each of the parties to a dispute, or 
plurality.121
It should already be clear from the above exposition, that Derrida’s relation-
ship with phenomenology (as well as with Husserl and Heidegger) is complex, 
somewhat more complex, I would suggest, than indicated by Van der Walt.122 
We already noted that Derrida shows the impossibility of distinguishing 
rigorously between language and consciousness of reality, a distinction which 
11 LS 27 28.
11 LS 22. Van der Walt LS 191 22 specifically invokes Derrida Force of Law 22-2 in support of his phe-
nomenological approach where Derrida speaks of the epokhé of the rule.
115 LS 20: “For Heidegger and Derrida…the closest that logos can ever come to ousias is through mourning 
the destruction of the multiplicity of ousias by the unitary representation of logos.” See also LS 208-209.
11 See LS 1 209-21 219-22. Truth (alētheia) unveils itself (in representation), but always remains hidden, 
withdrawn or veiled (its state of lēthe): LS 211. See further par  2 infra on friendship.
117 See also Derrida Speech and Phenomena - 58.
118 LS 19.
119 LS 208 (also LS 22-22).
120 LS 1.
121 LS 219 (also LS 1).
122 This is not the place to go into the detail of Derrida’s agreements and differences with Heidegger. Der-
rida undoubtedly admires this very profound thinker of the 20th century, but see, eg, Derrida Positions 
8-9 and 8-9 where he indicates his movement away from Heidegger because the latter’s texts still show 
signs of belonging to metaphysics. Heidegger also continues to privilege the voice and shows a disdain 
for literature. See also Kearney Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers (198) 109-110 where Derrida 
indicates that the major difference between him and Heidegger lies in their relation to language. This does 
of course not mean that Heidegger’s texts (as well as those of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Husserl and others) 
are homogeneous. As will be shown in par  infra, this is also the case with LS. 
phenomenology insists on and which Van der Walt attempts to complicate, but 
in the end retains.12 Phenomenology furthermore follows metaphysics in rely-
ing on the “presence of sense to a full and primordial intuition” as source for 
knowledge.12 Van der Walt follows in the steps of phenomenology and meta-
physics in this respect insofar as he relies on the consciousness of the irre- 
ducible existence of plurality as source of knowledge concerning language and 
law.125 Non-presence (language) is in other words thought of from the posi-
tion of presence (the irreducible plurality of existence of which consciousness 
must become aware).12 Phenomenology is also problematic in other respects. 
The “phenomenological epokhé”, as Derrida has pointed out (and as is argu-
ably the case with Van der Walt’s phenomenology) is “carried out in the name 
and in the sight of meaning”.127 In the phenomenological plurality of Van der 
Walt there is no transgression of meaning. Meaning remains tied to the inter-
ests of the parties to a dispute and therefore remains caught within a restricted 
economy.128 Derrida, through the “epokhé of the rule”, does not on my reading 
confront us with the crisis of having to reduce to one the multiple claims to jus-
tice of the parties to the dispute as Van der Walt contends.129 As we will see in 
more detail below, Derrida, by “bracketing” law, inscribes it within that which 
it cannot control: non-meaning, dissemination, dispossession, death, uncondi-
tional justice.10 The latter non-concepts do not belong to, but instead exceed 
or suspend phenomenology.11 Van der Walt’s phenomenological approach is in 
12 Derrida Speech and Phenomena - 58.
12 Derrida Speech and Phenomena 5.
125 On the essential link between phenomenology and metaphysics, see Derrida Writing and Difference 
(2001) 208-209 and Speech and Phenomena -5 9. See also LS 218. One has to be very careful in read-
ing Derrida’s statement in Positions 9-10, referred to in LS 221, that, as Van der Walt puts it, “[t]here is 
no transgression, no beyond of metaphysics”. The whole passage cannot be quoted here, but note that 
Derrida says “[t]here is not a transgression, if one understands by that a pure and simple landing into a 
beyond of metaphysics, at a point which also would be, let us not forget, first of all a point of language or 
writing….But by means of the work done on one side and the other of the limit the field inside is modified, 
and a transgression is produced that consequently is nowhere present as a fait accompli.”  
12 See LS 21-217. Cf in this respect Derrida Margins of Philosophy . As we saw, Van der Walt LS 218-219 
refers to alterity in the same breath as the “presence of a non-presence”. Absence for Van der Walt LS 219 
is “a spectral, if not eerie counter-mode of presence”. As Derrida Margins of Philosophy 5, however, 
notes, absence is simply a negative form of presence. 
127 Derrida Writing and Difference 9. See, eg, LS 17: “The political element of ‘political liberalism…only 
arises when two or more possible meanings or possible applications of a centrally undisputed constitutional 
or other normative value’ are disputed. The political arises only with the occurrence of a plurality of conflict-
ing opinions regarding the norms we supposedly hold in common.” Van der Walt also speaks of plurality in 
terms of the “ambiguity” in the law (LS 10 11). Ambiguity, like polysemia, but unlike dissemination, is still 
within the realm of meaning: see Derrida Margins of Philosophy 10, Monolingualism of the Other 2.
128 See also Derrida Writing and Difference . Van der Walt LS 22 distinguishes between pure conflict 
and representations of conflict. Even “pure conflict” (“as yet unresolved and untainted by any steps 
toward hermeneutic or symbolic resolution”) appears still to be tied to meaning (although not to herme-
neutic resolution).
129 LS 20. Cf Derrida Force of Law 22-2.
10 Derrida Writing and Difference 9. As appears from the rest of this article, Van der Walt’s interpretation 
of the mystical foundation of law as referring to plurality (LS 71 20) is highly contestable. The mystical 
foundation should, for the reasons stated, instead be read as related to unconditional justice (see Derrida 
Force of Law 19-20). See also Derrida Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits 
of Reason Alone in Derrida & Vatimo (eds) Religion (1998) 1 18-19 on the mystical foundation of author-
ity as that which allies the secret on the one hand to foundation and knowledge on the other. See further 
Derrida Writing and Difference (2001)  on sovereignty and silence in Bataille.
11 Derrida Rogues 18-150, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999) 51-5, Writing and Difference 9; Derrida 
& Ferraris A Taste for the Secret (2001) . 
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other words built on the problematic notion of a consciousness purely present 
to itself. As Derrida has shown in relation to Husserl, and as Van der Walt him-
self acknowledges12 there can be no pure self-consciousness, which is not from 
the beginning infiltrated by language.
This enables a different understanding of what Derrida says in Rogues 
about sovereignty. As Van der Walt correctly points out, sovereignty has to be 
expressed in language.1 Van der Walt, as we, however, saw above, retains con-
sciousness as the ultimate source of knowledge concerning law. Sovereignty in 
the guise of consciousness thus remains the structuring principle of law as sac-
rifice. If sovereignty’s condition of possibility is, however, to be found in the 
law of language, in counter-time, as Derrida contends, sovereignty is in radical 
fashion deprived of its identity. Its exercise would then not simply be condi-
tioned by opposing claims to justice, but by auto-immunity, unconditional jus-
tice, or incalculable reason.1  As we will see in what follows, Van der Walt’s 
views on language and time as well as his phenomenological approach signifi-
cantly affect the way in which he views the unconditional in Derrida’s thinking 
and the notion of sacrifice.
4	 The	conditional	and	the	unconditional
4 1 Hospitality and justice
As we saw above, Van der Walt regards hospitality as the conditio sine qua 
non of plurality, the condition without which the other cannot appear alongside 
the self so as to bring about plurality.15 In this respect, Van der Walt relies on 
Derrida’s analysis of hospitality in the context of a commentary (by Derrida) 
on Camus’s L’Hôte.1 In the story, as Van der Walt tells it, a French geogra-
phy teacher has to take an Arab prisoner to a police station. The teacher simply 
indicates to the prisoner where the prison is and leaves it to the prisoner to get 
there. The teacher is unsure whether the prisoner will indeed go to the prison, 
but he does. Van der Walt refers to Derrida’s comment that Camus maintains 
the ambiguity of the French word l’hôte. Van der Walt in turn comments as fol-
lows on this analysis:
“L’hôte means both ‘host’ and ‘guest’ and thus leaves open the question as to who is being the host 
and who the guest. The story thus portrays a non-subjective hospitality that exists between the French 
teacher and the Arab prisoner and cannot be said to originate in either one of them. At issue for 
Derrida is a certain event of hospitality, a certain differential event that graciously lets both the teacher 
and the prisoner be. For a moment at least, the hierarchical or vertical relation between the coloniser 
and the colonised is replaced or displaced by a horizontal relationship of mutual responsibility. The 
event of hospitality opens up the space that allows for the coming together of more than one. The 
12 LS 217-218.
1 LS 217. From LS 21 it appears that Van der Walt equates sovereignty and representation or language, 
whereas Derrida, as will be argued here, sees it differently.
1 Derrida Rogues 109 11 19. Although the terminology is somewhat different (“sovereignty” taking the 
place of the unconditional in Rogues, and “lordship” that of sovereignty), the same ideas are expressed by 
Derrida in his reading of Bataille in Writing and Difference -5. 
15 LS 12 220. 
1 See Derrida Responsabilité et Hospitalité in Derrida et al Manifeste pour l’Hospitalité (1999) 111 
117-119.
event of hospitality can thus be said to constitute the heart of the plurality that Arendt avers to be the 
conditio sine qua non and conditio per quam of political life.”17
Van der Walt thus reads reciprocity into the notion of hospitality. The teacher 
(coloniser) and the prisoner (colonised) are in a sense “reconciled” in a tem-
porary moment on Van der Walt’s reading. In my view, the text of Derrida 
which Van der Walt refers to, calls for a different interpretation.18 This again 
ties in closely with the discussion above of language in Derrida’s thinking. The 
text indeed speaks of the reversibility of the traditional host/guest relation-
ship. Derrida points out that the “host” (the French teacher, Daru) who, on the 
instructions of a French constable, has to hold an Arab man hostage for a day 
and is supposed to hand him over to the police station the next day, is in fact 
himself a guest of the Arab man. Daru, although he was born in Algeria, is a 
coloniser who is at home – at the other’s home, the Arab man’s home. Daru 
now has to take a decision as to whether he is going to hand over the man to the 
police – a responsibility that has to be taken on his own. He feeds the prisoner 
for some time (his host) and ends up not taking the decision himself, leaving 
it to the prisoner to take the decision. These passages do not in my view sup-
port a reading of hospitality as reciprocity or horizontality between a host and 
a guest. Instead, they speak of a disruption of Daru’s subjectivity,19 uncondi-
tional hospitality, asymmetry, and disproportionality.10 The link with what was 
said above regarding language should be clear.
What Derrida says in this text also appears to be perfectly in line with what 
he says in his other texts about hospitality as well as with the rest of his “phi-
losophy beyond philosophy”.11 In Adieu, Derrida similarly refers to the dual 
meaning of hôte.12 From these pages it is, however, clear that there is no men-
tion of reciprocity or horizontality when Derrida speaks about hospitality. The 
one (the host) who receives (the guest), Derrida says, is himself a guest in his 
own home:1
“He receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he receives it from his own home – which, 
in the end, does not belong to him. The hôte as host is a guest…. The one who welcomes is first wel-
comed in his own home. The one who invites is invited by the one whom he invites. The one who 
receives is received, receiving hospitality in what he takes to be his own home, or indeed his own land, 
according to a law that Rozenzweig also recalled. For Rozenzweig emphasized this originary dispos-
session, this withdrawal by which the ‘owner’ is expropriated from what is most his own, the ipse 
from its ipseity, thus making of one’s home a place or location one is simply passing through.”1
Van der Walt links the notion of horizontality and its relation to hospital-
ity also with Karin Blixen’s relationship with the “squatters” on her land; the 
17 LS 81.
18 I would like to express my gratitude to Jean-Baptiste Baribonekeza for his assistance with the translation 
of this text.
19 See also Derrida Politics of Friendship 8-9 on the disruption of subjectivity.
10 A similar reading of Camus’s text is offered by Davis “The Cost of Being Ethical: Fiction, Violence and 
Altericide” 200 Common Knowledge 21.
11 Derrida & Dufourmantelle Of Hospitality (2000); Derrida Hostipitality in Derrida Acts of Religion (2002) 
58, The Principle of Hospitality in Derrida Paper Machine (2005) , Hostipitality in Thomassen (ed) 
The Derrida-Habermas Reader (200) 208. 
12 1-.
1 Derrida Adieu 1.
1 Derrida Adieu 1-2. See also Derrida Aporias (199) 10.
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Thomist notion of a natural right to share the surface and fruits of the earth; 
Claude Lefort’s assertion that democracy is “government by everyone and by 
no one”; and Heidegger’s reference to time as “public”.15 That which Van der 
Walt detects in the legal order with reference inter alia to Aquinas1 – using a 
strategy, which is comparable with that of Derrida – is nevertheless a very con-
ditional form of hospitality (ownership remaining subject to the rights of the 
poor to satisfy the basic needs of life, liberty and dignity).17 Possession, albeit 
common possession, remains intact.18 In principle there is of course nothing 
wrong with a method like this, which seeks to find in the legal order more equi-
table, but nonetheless conditional, legal principles. It is, however, very differ-
ent from Derrida’s reading of texts of the tradition through which disposses-
sion, the incalculable or the unconditional comes to the fore.19 Van der Walt is 
clearly aware of the “radical” nature of Derrida’s thought.150 On my reading, 
however, he shows some discomfort in relation to this “radicalism”.151
This raises the question as to what Derrida means when he says, as Van der 
Walt points out, that absolute hospitality cannot be given effect to. This can be 
explored through a number of texts,152 but let us restrict ourselves to Derrida’s 
reflections on justice and hospitality. In all of Derrida’s texts that relate to these 
non-concepts he tells us of a paradox between the conditional and the uncondi-
tional. Derrida’s thinking on the unconditional is very close to that of Levinas, 
closer than Van der Walt indicates.15 When Derrida speaks of unconditional 
justice in Force of Law, he refers to it as being
“irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, 
without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, 
without reason and without rationality”.15
This is repeated in Specters of Marx where Derrida speaks of justice as the 
“incalculability of the gift and singularity of the an-economic ex-position to 
others”.155 In Before the Law, Derrida refers to the “law of laws” or the “law 
itself”15 which, as the text makes clear, has to be brought into relation with 
inter alia iterability, différance and unconditional justice in Derrida’s other 
texts.157 In his tribute to Mandela, Derrida refers to a superior law, also referred 
to as justice, the law of laws – a law which has not as yet presented itself – in 
15 LS 81-8. This of course ties in with the notion of time analysed in par  supra.
1 See similarly, the reliance on Grotius (LS 8-89), Locke (LS 90-9) and Kant (LS 9-9).
17 LS 85-8 92.
18 LS 85-87.
19 See, eg, Derrida Politics of Friendship 2-2; Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow…A Dialogue 
(200) -7.
150 See, eg, LS 220 where Van der Walt speaks of the boundlessness of hospitality which cannot but lead to 
self-destruction.
151 See, eg, Van der Walt’s statement that it is Levinas (and by implication not Derrida) who calls us to uncon-
ditional hospitality (LS 9). See also LS 220-221 and 258.
152 Also inter alia with reference to friendship which will be discussed infra.
15 This is clear from a reading of Derrida Adieu.
15 Derrida Force of Law 25. See further Derrida Glas 22-2 and Given Time on the gift.
155 Derrida Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International (199) 
22-2.
15 See Derrida Acts of Literature 18 191-192.
157 See in this respect also Derrida Force of Law 7.
the name of which Mandela challenges the legal system.158 This “law of laws” 
or unconditional justice “is” the condition of possibility of laws. Absolute hos-
pitality (with its “connotations” of being hostage to the other, of loss of posses-
sion) plays the same role in relation to conditional versions thereof.159
In all of these instances, Derrida also acknowledges that the unconditional 
cannot come to presence. It thus always finds expression in a conditional way. 
Nevertheless, it continues to haunt the conditional, entailing that the condi-
tional is never fully present to itself. This appears somewhat similar to what 
we find in Van der Walt, but it is to be noted that the unconditional in Derrida’s 
thinking does not entail any reciprocity. It is the conditional that entails reci-
procity as is the case with plurality in Van der Walt’s version thereof.10 There 
is in other words a continual tension between the conditional and the uncondi-
tional in Derrida’s thinking. Instead of saying that Derrida’s thinking is recon-
ciled with the fall or internal tragedy of hospitality,11 it would be more accurate 
to say that Derrida insists that there has to be a negotiation between the condi-
tional and the unconditional. It is furthermore from the “position” of absolute 
hospitality, unconditional justice and unconditional friendship that limitations 
need to be worked out.12
The promise of revolutionary constitutionalism that Van der Walt addresses 
in chapter 1 of LS can be viewed in a different light if we take account of Der-
rida’s “notions” of absolute hospitality and unconditional justice. This promise 
would then not be that of a re-horizontalisation of all instances of constitu-
tional review,1 but the promise of unconditional justice that every Constitu-
tion speaks of.1 Without opposing Van der Walt’s argument in principle con-
cerning the need for the horizontal application of fundamental rights, it could 
be said that unconditional justice requires of us to, in a certain way, retain the 
notion of verticality, which LS attempts to abolish from legal thinking. If we 
think of a court case in terms of an event, and if we think of an event as having 
a similar structure as unconditional justice,15 we can hear the need for vertical-
ity in the following words of Derrida:1
“When Lévinas or Blanchot speak of the ‘Très Haut’, the Most High, it is not simply religious ter-
minology. It means that the event as event, as absolute surprise, must fall on me. Why? Because if it 
doesn’t fall on me, it means that I see it coming, that there’s an horizon of expectation. Horizontally, 
I see it coming, I fore-see it, I fore-say it, and the event is that which can be said [dit] but never pre-
dicted [prédit]. A predicted event is not an event. The event falls on me because I don’t see it coming. 
Like the arrivant, the event is something that vertically befalls me when I didn’t see it coming.”
158 Derrida The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration in Derrida & Tlili (eds) For Nelson 
Mandela (1987) 1 22-29  7-8.
159 See the references in n 11 supra.
10 We will also see this in the discussion in par  2 infra of reconciliation and friendship in LS.
11 LS 220.
12 See Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 59-1.
1 LS 51.
1 I will explore this in a forthcoming publication with reference to Derrida Declarations of Independence 
in Derrida Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001 (2002) -5.
15 See Borradori Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida 
(200) 85-9; Derrida “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” 2007 Critical Inquiry 1.
1 2007 Critical Inquiry 51-52.
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Unconditional justice must be affirmed as that which always disrupts the law 
from on high. Unconditional justice in this way imposes an infinite responsi-
bility, which allows no rest for any good conscience.17 The horizontality of 
mortals18 still allows for a certain measure of complacency, as will be shown 
below.
4 2 Friendship and reconciliation
Van der Walt, as we saw above, links reconciliation with plurality and with 
the political and argues that these are (also) impossible.19 He speaks in this 
regard of the need for reconciliation of that which is “patently irreconcilable”, 
of the “perhaps” of reconciliation, and of reconciliation as “always to come”.170 
This is again related to the notion of counter-time and what Van der Walt refers 
to as “the time for friendship”.171 In Van der Walt’s thinking there can only be 
talk of friendship when there are two friends.172 At the same time friendship 
is impossible, because friendship is always conditioned by one, and some-
times by both “friends”.17 This is in turn extended to litigation where those 
who litigate (as “enemies”) were often friends or lovers before.17 The post-
apartheid theory of law, Van der Walt espouses, as we know, seeks to retrieve 
friendship (or plurality) from the ruins of litigation, where only one party will 
always come out as the winner.175 The above can also be expressed in terms of 
the impossibility of the reconciliation of liberties or claims to justice.17 Van 
der Walt speaks in this regard of the time of reconciliation, which cannot be 
thought of in terms of a presence, but as always to come.177
Van der Walt remains faithful to Derrida in saying that friendship between 
two friends is always conditional. However, as in other contexts, he empha-
sises the reciprocity or the dual nature of friendship (as well as of hospital-
ity, justice and democracy). On my reading, the way in which Derrida speaks 
of friendship is somewhat different from Van der Walt’s depiction thereof. In 
Politics of Friendship Derrida speaks of friendship in the same vein in which 
17 See the epigraph in LS from Derrida Specters of Marx xv.
18 LS 150.
19 LS 179-180 27. Another important “impossibility” appears in Van der Walt’s other texts: that of re- 
solving the counter-majoritarian problem. See Van der Walt & Botha 2000 Constellations 50; Van der 
Walt “Hospitality and the Ghost: A Response to Emilios Christodoulidis’s Article ‘The Paradoxes of 
Sovereignty’ (2002 TSAR 108)” 2002 TSAR 2. Derrida Rogues -18 on my reading suggests that the 
antinomy does not lie between rights and democracy, but between limited democracy (with limited rights) 
and the democracy to come.
170 LS 25 27.
171 LS 219. See also LS 22 where Van der Walt states that the counter-time “also goes by the names of friend-
ship, hospitality and justice in Derrida’s dreams about the possibility of the impossible” and par  supra.
172 LS 219 221 22.
17 LS 221.
17 LS 22.
175 LS 22.
17 LS 21-22.
177 LS 22.
he speaks of unconditional justice: a friendship that will not be based on sameness 
and reciprocity, but on dissymmetry.178 Derrida furthermore draws a clear distinc-
tion in a number of texts between reconciliation on the one hand and uncondi-
tional forgiveness and justice on the other.179 Derrida does not say that recon-
ciliation is impossible and he indicates that he (politically) supports attempts 
at the best possible reconciliation.180 At the same time he points out that recon-
ciliation always involves strategic calculations or an economy and that it always 
takes place on the basis of conditions favouring one of the parties.181 Derrida 
acknowledges that reconciliation can be thought of on the same terms as uncon-
ditional forgiveness and justice (“a more radical kind of reconciliation, beyond 
the political”), but points out that it is not usually thought of as such.182 Van der 
Walt’s attempt to think reconciliation in those terms, I would submit, still falls 
short of what Derrida states in relation to unconditional forgiveness.18 Asym-
metry, which Derrida regards as essential to forgiveness and justice, effectively 
falls away in Van der Walt’s conception of reconciliation (as well as in plural-
ity and the political) and is replaced by horizontality.18 Thinking of reconcili-
ation as being impossible does not succeed in taking us to a certain beyond of 
law or politics. Instead, by making reconciliation the (impossible) aim of law 
(as Van der Walt does), we remain within a relatively restrictive and conserva-
tive (liberal) conception of law. This could change if reconciliation is inscribed 
within unconditional justice or freedom without power.185 Negotiating between 
the conditional and the unconditional from these non-sites might sometimes lead 
to “better” or “more equitable” forms of reconciliation than one which simply 
seeks to momentarily reconcile “external liberties” by minimising harm.18
5	 Sacrifice
5 1 Sacrifice and the unconditional
As should be clear by now, and as the title clearly states, the notion of sac-
rifice is central to LS. Van der Walt, as we saw, calls for the acknowledgement 
178 See Derrida Politics of Friendship  with reference to Nietzsche: “Good friendship supposes dispropor-
tion. It demands a certain rupture in reciprocity or equality, as well as the interruption of all fusion or 
confusion between you and me. By the same token it signifies a divorce with love, albeit self-love.” Der-
rida (1-2  185 19-195 220 22-2) speaks in this regard also of an arche-friendship, an immemorial 
friendship, of non-reciprocity, dissymmetry, disproportion and the incalculable which makes friendship 
possible.
179 Derrida et al On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida in Caputo, Dooley & 
Scanlon (eds) Questioning God (2001) 52 57: “[F]orgiveness, if there is such a thing, should be devoid of 
any attempt to heal or reconcile.” See also Derrida & Kearney “A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida” 200 
Philosophy Today .
180 Derrida Philosophy Today -5. See also the convincing argument of Van der Walt LS 1 on the need for 
a legal politics of inclusion.
181 Derrida Philosophy Today , On Forgiveness 57. Van der Walt LS 15-1 also shows an awareness of 
this.
182 Derrida Philosophy Today 5, On Forgiveness 57, Archive Fever in South Africa in Hamilton et al (eds) 
Refiguring the Archive (2002) 8 7 7.
18 See also Derrida 1999 Fragmente 7-9. The closest Van der Walt comes to this is in LS 11-1 which 
will be discussed in par 5 1 infra.
18 Derrida On Forgiveness 57, Force of Law 20 22.
185 See Derrida Rogues 2-55.
18 See LS 2-28.
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of sacrifice in every judicial decision as such decisions inevitably amount to a 
destruction of plurality. In order to further stress the impossibility of plurality, 
Van der Walt refers first to Irigaray and then to Nancy. Van der Walt is, how-
ever, somewhat critical of both authors because, according to him, there is not 
a sufficient regard in their texts for the impossibility of plurality. Van der Walt 
also takes issue with Nancy because of the latter’s contention that we are on the 
eve of a non-sacrificial existence.187 Van der Walt believes that it is impossible 
to escape from sacrifice. In discussing Nancy’s notion of the partage, Van der 
Walt refers us to Derrida’s reading of Nancy in Rogues.188 Van der Walt sites 
three passages from Rogues and concludes as follows:
“Derrida’s insistence on the impossibility of the partage relates directly to his acute regard for 
the inevitability of traumatic sacrifices in human and social relationships. ‘Everything takes place 
between the sacrifice that cuts and the sacrifice that binds’, he writes in Resistances. ‘We sacrifice in 
order not to be sacrificed’, he states in Donner la Mort. He clearly holds history without sacrifice to 
be impossible [reference is made in a footnote to Cinders].”189
In principle, nothing that is objectionable can be found in this passage. It is 
regarding the implications of what is stated here that a few questions need to 
be raised. Can one conclude from what Derrida says as referred to in the above 
passage that the interests of a losing party in a court case are always “sacri-
ficed”? Can we furthermore conclude from the above that this sacrifice and 
the “unjustness” thereof need to be acknowledged in court cases? The answer 
to the first question will be in the negative. The answer to the second question 
will be a qualified yes.
The very sophisticated and informative argument of Van der Walt, which 
takes us through a reading of Hubert and Mauss,190 Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Bataille, Agamben and Nancy, as we saw, also accords a role to the thinking of 
Derrida. Van der Walt links the notion of sacrifice with Derrida’s thinking on 
sovereignty which was referred to above.191 The history of sovereignty, Van der 
Walt says following Nancy, is also a history of sacrifice.192 Van der Walt spe-
cifically attempts to link silence to sovereignty and to what Derrida says about 
sovereignty without language in Rogues – silence amounts to sovereignty and 
(unacknowledged) sacrifice.19 Van der Walt then proceeds to refer to man as 
“irreducibly the animal with language”.19 He can at most become the animal 
that fails or refuses to speak or to acknowledge sacrifice. Sovereignty concerns 
at most a refusal, but a thoroughly linguistic refusal to speak about sacrifice, a 
thoroughly linguistic refusal to acknowledge sacrifice.195 Sovereignty, accord-
187 LS 18-19.
188 See also LS 117.
189 LS 20 (footnotes omitted). The corresponding pages in the English edition of Cinders (Van der Walt refers 
to Feu la Cendre (1998) 28-2; I consulted the 1987 ed) are pages -8. 
190 It is noteworthy in this analysis that Van der Walt chooses to follow Hubert & Mauss (LS 17) and thereby, 
as he does in the case of language, implicitly adopts a notion of sacrifice which views death from the posi-
tion of presence, life and meaning (“death itself signifies the very impurity that life seeks to avoid”: LS 
10). Cf in this respect Derrida Speech and Phenomena 8 10.
191 See also LS 20-21.
192 LS 12.
19 LS 1. See also par  supra.
19 LS 1.
195 LS 18.
ing to Van der Walt, silences the law; sovereignty is the language of silenced 
and silent sacrifice.19
The expression “the animal with language”, referring thereby to man or 
humanity, is clearly objectionable in terms of Derrida’s thinking.197 Van der 
Walt is nevertheless correct to point to a relation in Derrida’s thinking between 
sovereignty and sacrifice. Even though Derrida may not in any of his texts 
expressly call for an acknowledgement of sacrifice, one could say that he does 
so implicitly. The more important questions that Van der Walt’s discussion 
raise relate to the structure of sacrifice and the kind of sacrifice that is involved 
in judicial decision-making. Because of Van der Walt’s views on language, as 
discussed above, because of the value he attaches to plurality, and because of 
the position that he gives to justice, the notion of sacrifice is extended to all 
parties that lose a case.198 On my reading, the texts which Van der Walt refers 
to in the above quotation call on us to think differently about what is regarded 
as sacrifice in the legal context and consequently also what kinds of sacrifice 
need to be acknowledged (if at all) in judicial decisions. For reasons of space 
we will be restricted to a short analysis of the passages from Cinders that Van 
der Walt refers to in the quotation.199 These passages contain quotations from 
Glas.200 In the relevant pages of Glas, Derrida discusses the first moment of 
natural religion in Hegel. Derrida shows how this figure of natural religion that 
Hegel speaks of – “the pure, all-embracing and all-filling luminous essence”, 
a figureless figure that burns itself in the all-burning – needs to guard itself, 
keep hold of itself, so as not to destroy itself completely. Only by keeping itself 
in reserve, can something remain to open the dialectical process and history. 
Derrida refers here to sacrifice both in the sense of pure destruction (“it sacri-
fices itself”) and in the sense of keeping hold of itself (“the sacrifice sacrifices 
itself”).201 Derrida extends this “notion” of the burning-retaining sacrifice to the 
pure gift without exchange which in a similar way has to economise itself in 
order to take on a stable subsistence.202
Sacrifice in Derrida’s texts is, as the above paragraph shows, clearly linked 
with calculation and the incalculable or the conditional and the unconditional20 
Calculation and therefore law20 (even a very progressive legal system) inevitably 
amounts to sacrifice.205 On my reading, this does not, however, translate into 
19 LS 17.
197 This is not because of an objection to man being referred to as an animal, but because animals are 
impliedly referred to by Van der Walt as being without language. Cf in this respect Derrida Of Gram-
matology 21 2-25; Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 2-7; Derrida “The Animal that 
therefore I am (More to Follow)” 2002 Critical Inquiry 9, Points…Interviews 1974-1994 (1995) 255-
287. Van der Walt’s closeness to Heidegger’s thinking perhaps comes to the fore here most clearly, if one 
takes account of Derrida’s remark in Points 28 that the “distinction between the animal (which has no or 
is not a Dasein) and man has nowhere been more radical nor more vigorous than in Heidegger”.
198 LS 219.
199 An analysis of the other texts of Derrida that are referred to – Derrida Resistances of Psychoanalysis 
(1998) and The Gift of Death would lead us to the same conclusions.
200 Derrida Glas (198) 28-2.
201 Derrida Glas 21 2.
202 Derrida Glas 2.
20 Van der Walt “Law as Sacrifice” 2001 TSAR 72 accurately notes and comments on this. 
20 See Derrida Force of Law 1 and 22 on the calculable nature of law.
205 See also Van der Walt 2001 TSAR 72.
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the sacrifice of every losing party to a judicial dispute. The sacrifice that is 
problematic for Derrida could more accurately be described as sacrificial logic, 
which can be linked with knowledge, calculation and the conditional.20 Only 
that which never comes to presence and which cannot be known – for example 
incalculable justice or absolute hospitality (amounting to a sacrifice of meaning) 
– is freed from the logic of sacrifice.207 The Gift of Death tells us that absolute 
responsibility requires of us to sacrifice; to sacrifice law, ethics and politics – all 
of which serve to protect us from the death instinct.208 Van der Walt’s discussion 
of Derrida in relation to sacrifice is again closely related to the way in which 
he understands Derrida’s views on language, and in this specific context, the 
relation between sovereignty and language.209 As noted above, Derrida contends 
in Rogues that sovereignty, because of its belonging to language and the need 
for it (that is, sovereignty) to be clothed with meaning, is inevitably shared 
from the “start”.210 Sovereignty is a consequence of language. Language is its 
condition of possibility. It can only have meaning through language. Because of 
Derrida’s views on language, he can conclude from this that sharing or language 
compromises in an auto-immune fashion the immunity of sovereignty. Again, 
we have here a relation between the calculable and the incalculable which is 
very different from a relationship between silence and unacknowledged sacrifice 
(sovereignty, law, already clothed with one meaning) on the one hand and 
speaking or the acknowledgement of sacrifice on the other (the retrieval of the 
plurality of meaning).211
The text of LS, perhaps in spite of the intentions of the author, nevertheless 
opens itself to the understanding of the notion of sacrifice as proposed above. 
Van der Walt at certain points, as we saw, insists that the result of every court 
case amounts to the sacrificial destruction of plurality (that is, the reduction to 
oneness of the multiple conflicting desires and concerns that inform the law in 
a contradictory fashion).212 LS, however, also speaks of “sacrificial reasoning”, 
which could be read as an acknowledgement that sacrifice occurs as a result of 
a failure to give effect to the demand of incalculable justice or absolute hos-
pitality, not simply by virtue of not holding in favour of one or the other party 
in a court case.21 This reading is made possible by the fact that Van der Walt 
also refers to law with reference to Derrida as “the sacrificial self-destruction 
of hospitality”.21 In chapter 5 of LS Van der Walt also continuously empha-
20 Derrida The Gift of Death  9-95.
207 See also Derrida Writing and Difference 2 (also 2 25 27 5) on Bataille reading Hegel: “Abso-
lute comicalness [general economy] is the anguish experienced when confronted by expenditure on lost 
funds, by the absolute sacrifice of meaning: a sacrifice without return and without reserves.”
208 Derrida The Gift of Death  7 95. See also the epigraph of LS, a quotation from Specters of Marx xv 
where Derrida refers to infinite responsibility. 
209 See par  supra. Derrida’s discussion of the sacrifice of the pharmakos in Dissemination 1-15 simi-
larly shows that writing, representation and death are to be found on the inside of life (the walls of the city) 
and therefore the impossibility of pure self-presence without representation (10-15). See also Derrida 
Limited Inc 90 10 on the parasite.
210 Derrida Rogues 101-102.
211 LS 1.
212 LS 11.
21 See LS 1.
21 LS 15.
sises what could be regarded as “unconditional provisions” of the Constitution, 
specifically regarding the socio-economic rights to health care and housing, 
and shows the problematic nature of all limitations of these “unconditional” 
rights.215 As Van der Walt furthermore shows with reference to the Grootboom 
case,21 even if a “deserving” party “wins” a case, resulting in a relatively pro-
gressive decision, the result may remain very far removed from unconditional 
justice. This translates into a thinking about justice that is no longer concerned 
with the reasonable calculation of benefits for a self-governing people. Think-
ing of justice in this way could clearly have important political consequences 
as will become clear in what follows.
5 2 Sacrifice and justification
As we saw above, Van der Walt resorts to justification in order to resolve the 
issue of which sacrifices should be accepted in society. He seeks to maintain 
the link with sacrifice by insisting that in justifying a decision, sacrifice should 
be acknowledged as well as the fact that the decision is ultimately based on 
unjust grounds. Van der Walt acknowledges the limits of justification (it cannot 
be just, in Van der Walt’s sense of this notion), but nevertheless hopes that this 
would lead to the acceptance of only those sacrifices or limitations of rights 
which are “inevitable”.217 Derrida’s texts do not on my reading contradict the 
argument of Van der Walt that there is a need for the justification of judicial (as 
well as executive and legislative) decisions (and even of the conduct of private 
parties). Like Van der Walt, but for different reasons, Derrida finds justifica-
tion problematic. This is primarily because of the different views they hold on 
justice. For Derrida, justification is in tension with the notion of infinite respon-
sibility. Justification, even when sacrifice and injustice are acknowledged, ulti-
mately amounts to self-justification.218 Van der Walt on the other hand links the 
notion of justification with the limitation clauses in Bills of Rights, and argues 
for the need to justify limitation with reference to the rights protected in a Bill 
of Rights.219
If we accept the need for justification, should this justification not go beyond 
the rights in a Bill of Rights, which are already restricted forms of the uncon-
ditional promise of justice contained in a Constitution?220 Is justification not 
instead to take place first with reference to unconditional justice? A court case 
involving the Constitution necessarily involves a judge in the unconditional. 
Unconditional justice calls on her to do the impossible. The unconditional can 
nevertheless only be given effect to through calculation. For unconditional 
justice to have “force”, a judge therefore also has to calculate and most impor-
tantly, to justify this limitation.221 Although a reference to the limitation clause 
(if any) of a Bill of Rights) will necessarily also have to take place, what is first 
215 LS  11-1.
21 LS 1-15.
217 LS 11 19.
218 Derrida The Gift of Death 2. 
219 LS 1-17.
220 See Derrida Negotiations 105.
221 Derrida Force of Law 2.
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of all required is a negotiation between the unconditional and the conditional. 
To put it in yet simpler terms, in every instance where the Constitution is inter-
preted or applied, the unconditional needs to come to the fore.222 This uncondi-
tional is that which makes a Constitution possible and can therefore not simply 
be ignored.22 Only after an exposure to the unconditional, and from this non-
site, can calculation, that is interpretive methods, values, and principles start to 
play a role. The latter inevitably brings us into the realm of self-justification, a 
movement away thus from unconditional justice.
5 3 The politics of sacrifice
Van der Walt refers to his own political position with reference to Derrida as 
“a progressivism without illusion”.22 This position is inspired by the distinc-
tion between politics and the political that Van der Walt subscribes to. He also 
invokes Kennedy’s fundamental contradiction in support of this approach:
“[A]n acute regard for the fundamental contradiction is crucial to the post-apartheid theory of law 
that [is] developed in this book, for a post-apartheid law would indeed require that the liberal and 
conservative ‘counterparts’ to which Kennedy refers in the passage above would indeed be counter-
parts. It would require that they not be so far apart that they cannot, when circumstances demand, 
take stances that deviate from their typical ideological positions, stances that are for this reason 
non-ideological.”225
In light of this, it appears somewhat strange that Van der Walt nonetheless 
argues in favour of what some would refer to as clear ideological or political 
positions. He takes, for example, a firm position in favour of the direct hori-
zontal application of fundamental rights in the name of the promise of a revo-
lutionary constitutionalism22 and takes a stand against the death penalty.227 He 
also argues strongly against neo-colonialism and neo-feudalism in the form of 
global capitalism.228 It could plausibly be argued that in all the above instances 
the South African Constitution provides room for debate, in other words for “a 
contradictory plurality of voices” (using Van der Walt’s terminology).229 One 
could furthermore ask whether there is in regard to the above positions not also 
room for “reasonable dissent” and “a fundamental plurality of voices regard-
ing the question that is to be decided”.20 These positions are furthermore taken 
seemingly without the author subjecting himself to his self-imposed require-
ment of acknowledging the sacrifice to the opposing interests involved (that is, 
in favour of indirect horizontal application, the death penalty and global capi-
222 Legal scholars often understand Derrida’s reference to justice as singularity in Force of Law 25 as imply-
ing that Derrida finds problematic the generality of law, which denies the singularity of every case. There 
can be little doubt that singularity is important in Derrida’s thinking. The singularity of every decision 
nevertheless calls first of all for an exposure to the unconditional: see, eg, Derrida Points 59.
22 See n 1 supra.
22 LS 77. 
225 LS 1.
22 LS 51.
227 See ch .
228 LS 72.
229 See LS 15.
20 See LS 10-11. Van der Walt acknowledges the ideological nature of the disagreement on horizontal 
application: see LS    n .
talism) or of the need to “set aside” or “keeping alongside” the other political 
view. How is this to be explained?
Van der Walt is likely to argue that (at least some or perhaps all of) the posi-
tions he takes in the above regard (also insofar as the interpretation of the Con-
stitution is concerned) are not “politics”, but that they fall within the sphere 
of “the political”, that which makes politics possible or which “allows for the 
emergence of ideological preferences”.21 The political thus appears to be situ-
ated above or beyond politics, thereby succeeding to escape from the charge 
of simply constituting an ideological position.22 The arguments on direct hori-
zontal application and the death penalty are most clearly linked to plurality by 
Van der Walt.2 Can the political or plurality in Van der Walt’s model, however, 
lay claim to fall within a space which “is” beyond politics? As was contended 
above, only the unconditional can in a certain sense transgress metaphysics, 
ideology and politics.2 The “political” that Van der Walt espouses, as can be 
seen from his view of the legal decision as comparable to the flipping of a coin 
or to juggling, instead comes very close to political relativism.25 This also hap-
pens through his extension of the notion of sacrifice to the interest(s) that lose 
out in every judicial decision or every “serious” judicial decision.2 Had Van 
der Walt “followed” Derrida more closely, this could have been avoided.27
A further question must be asked regarding the political consequences of Van 
der Walt’s approach, specifically as set out in the passage quoted above. If left 
and right are not to be “too far apart”28 and if the position of the “swing” judge 
is exalted,29 is there really still a chance for revolutionary constitutionalism? 
Van der Walt’s approach requires that a Court must acknowledge the sacrifice 
of the interests of a particular “losing” litigant (and therefore the “injustice” of 
such sacrifice), not only in politically conservative decisions (where acknowl-
edging sacrifice does appear appropriate), but also in progressive ones.20 My 
concern relating to the potential political consequences of such an approach 
should be apparent from a somewhat lengthy list of examples from real and 
imagined “serious” cases. Such a list will show that the concern is not an iso-
lated one and that it relates not only to disputes between the State and individ-
uals, but also between natural/juristic persons. Herewith the list: a judgment 
21 LS 15. Van der Walt LS 8, eg, invokes the horizontal application of fundamental rights as “the ultimate 
way in which the law can be revised in terms of public interest”.
22 As we saw in par  supra, the political could be situated on level 1 and, in a way, level  of Van der Walt’s 
analysis, and politics on level 2.
2 Concerning the “free market”, Van der Walt LS 21 refers to this as a “unitary system of representation” 
which ruins plurality.
2 See par  supra. Van der Walt’s approach is also aimed at legitimacy, which Derrida Force of Law  15 
views in calculable terms similar to law. See LS 22 where Van der Walt states that “a post-apartheid 
theory of law would hope to make possible an ongoing respect for law in the face of inevitable interim 
legal coercion”. See also LS 178-179 220 2.
25 LS 229 2-28.
2 See, eg, Van der Walt’s acknowledgement in LS 71 regarding the Carmichele case. 
27 For Derrida’s response to an accusation of relativism, see Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 22 
and Derrida et al Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida in Kearney & 
Dooley (eds) Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (1999) 5 78-79.
28 LS 1.
29 LS 1-1 190.
20 One could, however, ask whether a progressive decision in all cases would not be infinitely more prefer-
able than acknowledging the sacrifice of conservative decisions.
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which invalidates legislation which authorises the death penalty;21 a judgment 
bringing about the decriminalisation of prostitution;22 a judgment which inval-
idates discriminatory legislation (based for example on race, gender or sexual 
orientation);2 a judgment holding that the right to freedom of religion entitles 
a Rastafarian to use cannabis without the threat of criminal sanction;2 a judg-
ment holding that a T-shirt company may poke fun at a multinational company 
without a sense of humour;25 a judgment holding that the State is vicariously 
liable for the rape of a woman by on-duty policemen offering to give her a 
lift home in the early hours of the morning;2 a judgment holding that refugee 
applicants are entitled to reasons for decisions denying them such status;27 a 
judgment holding that a developer is not allowed to proceed with the building 
of houses for the rich and famous on the slopes of Table Mountain and in the 
process destroy the environment and trample on the rights of a minority reli-
gious community;28 a judgment holding that the State needs to provide preg-
nant mothers with nevirapine to prevent the infection of babies with HIV;29 
and a judgment holding that the State cannot simply cancel social benefits (on 
suspicion of corruption) without affording those affected a hearing.250
One is entitled to ask why it would be necessary in these “serious” cases, 
which all in some way or another extend (rather than restrict) equal freedom 
or freedom without power, to acknowledge “sacrifice”.251 Is there indeed any 
sacrifice which is worthy of being acknowledged here in spite of the “serious-
ness” of the cases? If one is to speak here of sacrifice, would it not rather be 
with reference to those who still remain excluded from the benefits of these 
rights?252 Is it not to them – those who will often not be in the courtroom – 
that any apology of unjust sacrifice should be directed? Is the acknowledge-
ment of the “sacrifices” that the homophobes, xenophobes, chauvinists, bigots, 
21 S v Makwanyane 1995  SA 91 (CC).
22 S v Jordan 2002  SA 2 (CC) (majority dismissing challenge to legislation criminalising prostitution).
2 See, eg, National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA  (CC); National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); Moseneke v The 
Master 2001 2 SA 18 (CC); Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002  SA 1 (CC); Min-
ister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International and Others, Amici Curiae) 200 1 SA 52 
(CC); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 200 1 SA 52 (CC).
2 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 79 (CC) (majority dismissing challenge to constitu-
tional validity of legislation which criminalises the use of cannabis, also in relation to Rastafarians).
25 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SabMark International (Freedom of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 200 1 SA 1 (CC).
2 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005  SA 19 (CC).
27 Xu v Minister van Binnelandse Sake 1995 1 SA 185 (T) (Court holding that “aliens” not entitled to reasons 
in the event of the refusal of residence permits).
28 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 200  SA 222 (SCA).
29 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). See LS 7 where Van der Walt 
states that the decision of the government in this regard patently lacked justification, which may imply 
that a Court would in such a case not have to acknowledge any sacrifice.
250 Rangani v Superintendent-General, Department of Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999  SA 
85 (T); Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
2000 2 SA 89 (E).
251 See Derrida Rogues 8-9 on the unconditionality of (equal) freedom. 
252 The case of Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 200 
 SA 505 (CC) (held that permanent residents entitled to right of access to social security) illustrates the 
point well that it is not always the interests of the party that loses that get sacrificed. In this case it is those 
that are still excluded, that get “sacrificed”. See also Van Marle “Lives of Action, Thinking and Revolt 
– A Feminist Call for Politics and Becoming in Post-Apartheid South Africa” 200 SAPL 05 2-28.
racists, capitalists and heartless politicians and bureaucrats would have to make 
in some of the examples above, not instead likely to lead to further restrictions 
on the unconditional equality (also of non-citizens) which Derrida says the 
democracy to come concerns itself with?25 Does the acknowledgement of this 
kind of sacrifice not risk becoming an easy way out for a Court that does not 
want to face up to its responsibility of complying with the demand of uncon-
ditional justice, while taking account of law?25 Does this approach not risk 
making Derrida’s thinking more acceptable to and “utilizable” for those on the 
right than those on the left?
It is my contention that, compared to Derrida, Van der Walt has a very dif-
ferent understanding of progressivism without illusion. For Derrida this clearly 
entails a left politics without the naïve belief that this amounts to unconditional 
justice. The reason for this is not the fact that the triumph of a left position 
in a court case has led to the sacrifice of the politically conservative point of 
view, but because it will never have gone far enough, as is clear from Der-
rida’s exposition of absolute hospitality.255 Deconstruction leaves us with the 
imperative to negotiate the best possible response between the unconditional 
and the conditional.25 It is when we attempt to negotiate between two condi-
tional positions that a left politics is likely to lean towards conservatism. This 
becomes clear when we focus on certain of the political positions Van der Walt 
adopts in LS.257 Van der Walt for example appears rather comfortable with the 
need for (harsh) punishment for crime in his discussion and rejection of the 
death penalty.258 He also appears somewhat complacent in his acceptance of the 
need for immigration control in respect of those he refers to as “aliens”.259 One 
could furthermore, without endorsing the arms deal, raise questions regarding 
Van der Walt’s “putting South Africa first” policy in relation thereto.20 Van der 
Walt’s reference to man as “the animal with language”, referred to above, also 
has potentially conservative political consequences. This is especially the case 
insofar as the alleged absence of language in animals has throughout history 
been relied on, whether explicitly or implicitly, for the imposition of incred-
ible cruelty towards as well as to the slaughter and pleasurable consumption of 
animals.21 This is continuing every day. It is also in this respect significant that 
Van der Walt attaches great value only to human dignity and to the rights of cit-
izens.22 This is related to the close association that Van der Walt draws between 
25 See Derrida Rogues 2-5 1.
25 See Derrida Force of Law 22-29.
255 See, eg, Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 59-1. See also Derrida in Kearney Dialogues with 
Contemporary Continental Thinkers (198) 119 on the “radicality” of deconstruction.
25 See Derrida On Forgiveness 58-59, Paper Machine 127 128 11, Manifeste pour l’Hospitalité 1.
257 Except for the examples that follow or as elsewhere indicated, I find myself in substantial agreement with 
Van der Walt’s left politics as expressed in LS.
258 LS 112-11 117. Cf in this regard Derrida & Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 1 read with 227 n 15. LS 
117 n  nevertheless notes the difficulties involved with punishment.
259 LS 220. This is closely related to Van der Walt’s retention of the notion of (shared) possession by the citi-
zens of a nation-state as characteristic of plurality: see LS 70 12. Cf in this respect Derrida Negotiations 
(2002) 99-10.
20 LS 0-1.
21 See n 197 supra.
22 LS 17 5 70. See also Van der Walt’s comfortable association of his approach of horizontalisation with 
humanism: LS 189-190. He also states that it is “humanity” that holds all goods in common: LS 85.
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justice and self-government.2 Self-government, as we know, is directly related 
to (democratic) sovereignty, not to the democracy to come.2 It also relates to 
Van der Walt’s view of liberty or freedom, which, although it seeks to allow 
for the simultaneous existence of two, still remains very close to the notion of 
freedom as power.25 If the unconditional, the hyper-ethical, or hyper-political 
in Derrida’s thinking is brought to the fore, a more progressive politics (regard-
ing for example “criminal” sanctions, immigration, humanitarian aid, and rela-
tions with animals) is likely to follow from this, whilst realising that whichever 
policy is adopted, we would never have gone far enough.2
6	 An	alternative	post-apartheid	theory	of	law
Van der Walt’s LS is clearly one of the most sophisticated attempts to date 
to reflect on the implications of the thinking of Derrida in relation to law. My 
contention in this article has nevertheless been that justice, in Derrida’s terms, 
requires much more of us than Van der Walt contends. Justice, it was argued 
above, should not be related to the claims to justice of parties to a dispute. 
Instead, Derrida speaks of justice in the same breath as incalculable equal-
ity, absolute hospitality and the perfect gift. This “idea” of justice breaks with 
equivalence, reciprocation and calculation. Derrida’s texts tell us that judges 
need to negotiate between the unconditional and the conditional. Uncondi-
tional justice requires sacrifice – the sacrifice of the self; that is also of the law 
which ultimately serves the interests of those in society whose reason as well 
as freedom (viewed as power) and property interests tend to be the strongest. 
Only by negotiating a response between the conditional and the unconditional 
would justice stand a chance in any judicial decision. The notions of plural-
ity, the political, the fundamental contradiction and sacrifice, as understood 
and utilised by Van der Walt, are unlikely to lead to radical constitutionalism. 
This allows us to think differently about the “problem” with apartheid. I would 
contend that the problem with apartheid was not its attempt to represent plu-
rality, which ultimately destroyed plurality, without any regard for plurality’s 
inevitable withdrawal.27 The “problem” was rather that it strayed extremely 
and unacceptably far, even as far as possible one could say, from the uncon-
ditional. It was ultimately, as Van der Walt also indicates, centred on iden-
tity, purity, exclusivity, community and sovereignty on the basis of pure self 
presence (a belief in “legalising” that which is “natural” and God-ordained).28 
A post-apartheid theory of law should rather, as was sketched in outline above, 
show the fallacy of constructions based on the idea of pure self-presence and 
affirm the inevitable haunting of representation by the unconditional.
2 See LS 178 180 181 182.
2 See Derrida Rogues -18. As Manderson “The Care of Strangers” August 2 2002 Australian Financial 
Review 1-2 correctly points out, “the self and the tribe are simply two ways of putting me first”.
25 See LS 150-151 2-22. Cf in this respect Derrida Rogues 2-55.
2 See Derrida Rogues 152.
27 LS 8 12 12.
28 LS 1 125.
It is likely that a certain Johan van der Walt would not disagree with this 
“alternative” post-apartheid theory of law.29 LS begins and ends by contem-
plating a passage from Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit which Van der Walt trans-
lates as follows:
“The niveau of a science is determined by the extent of her capacity for a crisis as regards her foun-
dational principles.”270
Van der Walt emphasises the word “crisis” in this passage and says that it 
should be understood as “incapacity”.271 The word “crisis” in this passage, Van 
der Walt says, “points to an incapacity that overcomes us under certain circum-
stances, an incapacity in which we happen to land”.272 LS, he adds, involves an 
explication of “the crisis with which the demand for post-apartheid law and the 
self-foundation of legal science confronts us”.27 LS must therefore address ori-
gin and becoming, but in relation to an incapacity. Incapacity of course speaks 
of inability and powerlessness, of a subject that is no longer in control, of the 
host becoming the guest, of the other taking the decision in me, of absolute 
hospitality, of the perfect gift. Language, as we saw, is for Derrida similarly 
marked by the incapacity of a subject, announcing the death of the subject.27 
LS, a book which is dominated by the theme of a still somewhat restricted 
economy of plurality, as the above-quoted passages show, is made possible by 
the thought of the unconditional, a thought which is inextricably intertwined 
with the structure of language.
This also allows us to think differently about the “structure” of LS. As 
we saw above, Van der Walt refers to man as “irreducibly the animal with 
language”.275 We see here that van der Walt views language and representation 
as always already disrupting presence, even in silence (the silence of language 
which cannot represent plurality). Van der Walt furthermore refers to hospital-
ity as “the condition sine qua non and the conditio per quam of plurality”.27 
Instead of understanding hospitality as another name for plurality (as in the 
reading above), hospitality can be understood as the introduction of a fourth 
level of analysis (in addition to the three mentioned above).277 This necessarily 
complicates the levels of analysis in Van der Walt’s thinking. In brief, it would 
have the result of abolishing level 1 in LS. Levels 2 and  would furthermore be 
understood as different possible versions of the conditional, derived not from 
level 1, but from level . Law perceived thus is likely to be more open to abso-
lute hospitality, in a way that is somewhat similar, but nevertheless more pro-
29 The allusion here is of course to the heterogeneity that Derrida continuously explores in his reading of 
texts from the tradition; see eg Derrida Specters of Marx 1.
270 See LS 1: “Das  Niveau einer Wissenschaft bestimmt sich daraus, wie weit sie einer Krisis ihrer Grund-
begriffe fähig ist.”
271 LS 2 2.
272 LS 2.
27 LS 2.
27 It is also significant to note that the moment of crisis in Husserl, whom Van der Walt as we saw follows to 
a certain extent, is always a crisis of language: see Derrida Speech and Phenomena 81, Edmund Husserl’s 
Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (1989) 92 n 9. 
275 LS 1.
27 LS 12.
277 See par  supra.
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gressive than what Van der Walt prescribes for level . Read as such, LS will 
have inaugurated in an exemplary fashion a post-apartheid theory of law.278
OPSOMMING
 In sy onlangse boek, Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law, gee Johan van der 
Walt ’n duidelike uiteensetting van die moontlike impak van onder andere Jacques Derrida se denke 
op die reg. In hierdie artikel word die boek krities geanaliseer en word daar aangetoon dat Derrida se 
tekste vir ’n ander interpretasie oopstaan. Met verwysing na ’n aantal temas word aangetoon dat Der-
rida se denke meer verreikend is as in Van der Walt se model. Die onvoorwaardelike speel byvoorbeeld 
in Derrida se denke ’n kardinale rol terwyl dit bykans afwesig is in Van der Walt se model. Van der Walt 
beklemtoon die noodsaaklikheid van pluraliteit en die onmoontlikheid van versoening tussen verskil-
lende sienings van die reg in ’n bepaalde saak. So ’n benadering kan konserwatiewe politieke gevolge 
inhou. ’n Ander interpretasie van Derrida, waar die onvoorwaardelike voorop staan, hou meer belofte in 
vir ’n na-apartheid regsteorie.
278 To end on a more personal note: it is this strain of the unconditional in Van der Walt’s thinking that has 
always held an immense attraction for me.
